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UNIONS: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
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CI Tshoose 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this article is to analyse the impact of section 18 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (hereinafter the LRA) on the constitutionally entrenched 
right of every person to freedom of association, the right of every trade union to 
engage in collective bargaining,1 and the right of every trade union to organise. 
Furthermore, this article examines the justifiability of the impact of section 18 on 
minority trade unions in terms of international labour standards and the Constitution. 
In the first part of this article we commence with a brief overview of the concept of 
majoritarianism, pluralism and industrial unionism in the context of the South African 
labour market. Part Two deals with the impact of section 18 of the LRA on minority 
trade unions, whilst Part Three explores the concept of workplace democracy. Part 
Four investigates the applicability of international labour standards in the context of 
the right to freedom of association, and the last part of this article deals with 
conclusions and recommendations on the impact of section 18 of the LRA. 
 
The advent of the new political dispensation in 1994 heralded the coming of a new 
labour dispensation. Labour relations and labour policies changed significantly from 
those which prevailed under the previous government. The African National 
Congress came into power with the backing and support of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party. After the ANC became 
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the ruling party, those sections of society that had brought the organisation into 
power harboured great expectations from the ANC government. Workers expected 
government to serve their interests and this expectation was fervently advocated 
and promoted by former trade unionists who found themselves in the ANC 
government at the time or who formed part of the structures of the alliance partners 
of the ANC.2 Godfrey et al3 note that the review of the labour legislation framework 
was at that stage a priority for the new government, with specific focus on the 
review of the collective bargaining dispensation.  
 
The abuse of trade unions under the previous government gave rise to a unique 
entrenchment of labour rights in the Constitution.4 The drafters thereof were 
determined to avoid a repetition after 1994 of this abuse.5 Section 23 of the 
Constitution goes to great lengths to protect, amongst other matters, the right to 
form and join a trade union,6 the right of every trade union to organise7 and the 
right of every trade union to engage in collective bargaining.8 The LRA was 
promulgated In furtherance of section 23(5) of the Constitution. An important 
purpose thereof is to provide a regulatory framework for collective bargaining in 
South Africa.9 The LRA remedied an important deficiency of its predecessor, the 
1956 LRA, namely the uncertainty regarding the rules and principles governing 
collective bargaining.10 One of the most significant changes in the new LRA was that 
it now provided for legislated organisational rights.11 
 
Macun12 argues that commentators have often viewed the LRA as favouring larger 
unions and as conferring clear advantages on unions with majority support at the 
establishment or industry level. Chapter III of the LRA regulates collective 
                                                 
2  Bendix Industrial Relations 81. 
3  Godfrey, Theron and Visser 2007 www.dpru.uct.ac.za 23. 
4  Section 23 of the Constitution. 
5  Grogan Collective Labour Law 11. 
6  Section 23(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
7  Section 23(4)(b) of the Constitution. 
8  Section 23(5) of the Constitution. 
9  Section 1(c)(i) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
10  Grogan Collective Labour Law 11. 
11  Bendix Industrial Relations 81. 
12  Macun 1997 LDD 69-81.  
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bargaining.13 While this chapter seemingly promotes a pluralistic14 approach to 
organisational rights it is decidedly biased towards majoritarianism.15 This is the case 
despite minority trade unions fulfilling an important role in the current labour 
system, especially when it comes to the balance of power in the employment arena. 
 
Besides the right of a majority trade union16 to appoint representatives17 and the 
right to disclosure of information by the employer to enable the trade union 
representative to effectively perform his/her duties as such,18 the incentives for 
majoritarianism in the LRA include the right to enter into a collective agreement 
setting thresholds of representivity for the granting of access, stop-order and trade 
union leave rights to minority unions (section 18), the right to conclude agency shop 
and closed shop agreements (sections 25 and 26), the right to apply for the 
establishment of a workplace forum (section 80 and 81) and the right to conclude 
collective agreements which will bind employees who are not members of the union 
or unions party to the agreement.19 
 
It is argued in this article that despite the LRA's purpose of advancing economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and democratisation of the workplace by 
fulfilling its primary objects, which include the promotion of employee participation 
in decision making in the workplace,20 the LRA prohibits this from happening through 
the nature of a number of its provisions. Under the guise of striving to promote 
orderly collective bargaining,21 a number of sections of the LRA benefit majority 
                                                 
13  Sections 11-63 of the LRA. 
14  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 246. Du Toit defines the term pluralism as “the term that was 
used under the previous Act to describe a model of collective bargaining that in contrast to the 
majoritarian model, grants recognition to more than one trade union provided they are 
sufficiently reprensentative of a defined bargaining unit”. 
15  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 246. 
16  Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 332. The author defines majority unions as “… those registered 
unions that on their own, or in combination with any one or more unions, have as their members 
the majority of the employees employed by the employer in a workplace. This requires that at 
least 50 per cent plus 1 of the employees employed in the workplace must be members of the 
union(s)”. 
17  Section 14 of the LRA. 
18  Section 16 of the LRA. 
19  Section 23(1)(d)(iii) of the LRA; Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 246. 
20  Section 1(d)(iii) of the LRA. 
21  Section 1(d)(i) of the LRA. 
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unions inordinately, while minority trade unions often find themselves faced with 
insurmountable obstacles that prevent them from being able to engage in collective 
bargaining.   
 
Section 18 of the LRA is the central topic of discussion in this article. It promotes a 
system of collective bargaining in which the position of majority unions is enhanced 
while minority unions are marginalised. Pluralism and diversity, which should be 
respected in a democracy, are being stifled through the application of section 18 of 
the LRA. 
 
The LRA contains a number of provisions aimed at promoting majoritarianism.  
Amongst these, section 18 has a particularly detrimental effect on minority trade 
unions. It empowers a majority trade union and an employer to conclude a collective 
agreement establishing a threshold of representativeness required in respect of one 
or more of the organisational rights referred to in sections 12, 13 and 15. This article 
aims to evaluate the impact of section 18 on minority trade unions and to examine 
the constitutionality of this section in the context of international labour standards. 
 
2 Brief overview of the concept of pluralism and majoritarianism 
 
In order to have a better understanding of section 18 of the LRA, a brief discussion 
of majoritarianism and pluralism is warranted. Baskin and Satgar note that: 22 
 
...the LRA is profoundly majoritarian. Unions with majority support get distinct 
advantages. Small, minority and craft-based unions are disadvantaged. The 
message for unions is clear...grow or stagnate. 
 
Pluralism  is defined as "... a term used by the predecessor of the LRA to describe a 
model of collective bargaining that, in contrast to the majoritarian model grants 
recognition to more than one trade union, provided they are sufficiently 
representative, of a defined bargaining unit."23 Being regarded as sufficiently 
                                                 
22  Baskin and Satgar New Labour Relations 12. 
23  Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 246. 
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representative clears the way for unions that are regarded as such to be viewed as 
representative.24 Being regarded as representative allows trade unions to claim 
organisational rights in terms of sections 1225 and 1326 of the LRA. 
 
Bendix27 refers to the pluralist approach as central to the conduct of the labour 
relationship. The pluralist approach presupposes that with different trade unions 
representing different interests, power will be distributed in a manner that is fair. It 
will contribute thereto that the unbridled exercise of power by one trade union is 
avoided because of the countervailing power of another trade union. 
 
The model of majoritarianism, on the other hand, bestows a degree of primacy on 
unions with majority membership (at least 50%+1) in a workplace.28 Besides the 
rights contained in sections 12 and 13 of the LRA, a number of empowering 
provisions in Chapter III of the LRA exist. These incentives, designed to promote a 
majoritarian system of collective bargaining in which a number of strong unions 
prevail as bargaining agents, are at the heart of the problems facing minority trade 
unions. 
 
3 The impact of section 18 of the LRA on minority trade unions  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa's constitutional democracy is built on a number of cornerstones. One 
important cornerstone is that of human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms.29 Equality before the law is a 
fundamental right which is enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution.30 Everyone is 
equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. 
                                                 
24  Section 11 of the LRA. 
25  The right to trade union access to an employer's workplace. 
26  The right to trade union subscriptions and levies. 
27  Bendix Industrial Relations 253. 
28  Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 361.  
29  Section 1 of the Constitution. 
30  Section 9 of the Constitution provides that "everyone is equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law". 
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Despite this constitutional right, it appears that equality before the law for all trade 
unions is often not seen in practice. 
 
The purpose of this part is to evaluate the impact and effect of the provisions of 
section 18 when it is abused by majority trade unions and employers. Case law 
dealing with this question is severely limited and therefore interviews had to be 
conducted to cast light on the subject. 
 
3.2 The right to establish thresholds of representativeness 
  
Section 18(1) of the LRA states as follows: 
 
An employer and a registered trade union whose members are a majority of the 
employees employed by that employer in a workplace, or the parties to a 
bargaining council, may conclude a collective agreement establishing a threshold of 
representativeness required in respect of one or more of the organisational rights 
referred to in sections 12, 13 and 15. 
 
3.3 The application of section 18: Solidarity’s experience in the mining 
industry 
 
Interviews conducted with Solidarity Trade Union on the impact of section 18 in the 
mining industry indicated that the provisions of section 18 are used by majority 
trade unions to set inordinately high thresholds for representivity, thereby effectively 
ensuring that Solidarity and other minority unions, which have been consistently 
reaching thresholds for representivity within specific bargaining units, lose 
recognition where the higher threshold cannot be reached.31 
 
                                                 
31  Interview 1: Gideon du Plessis: Deputy-General Secretary (Solidarity Trade Union) 2012; 
Interview 2: André van der Merwe: Head Mining Industry (Solidarity Trade Union) 2012; 
Interview 3: Louis Pretorius: Senior National Organiser: Mining (Solidarity Trade Union) 2012. 
See also South African Post Office Ltd v Commissioner Nowosenetz 2013 2 BLLR 216 (LC). This 
case illustrates the position faced by minority unions in cases dealing with the determination of 
the threshold for organisational rights. In this case the union was denied organisational rights to 
which it was entitled in terms of the settlement agreement, but the employer and majority union 
had subsequently raised the threshold in a fresh agreement. This resulted in the fresh 
agreement novating earlier agreements and precluding the minority union from claiming rights 
acquired under the earlier agreements. 
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A further tactic by majority unions seems to entail the re-negotiation of the 
bargaining unit structure. The aim of this tactic is to diminish the number of 
bargaining units by incorporating the bargaining units where minority trade unions, 
such as Solidarity, are organised, into one big bargaining unit. The effect is that 
minority unions find it difficult to reach the required threshold in the new bargaining 
structure in circumtances where it has consistently done so  in terms of the previous 
bargaining unit structure. 
 
A number of examples of the manner in which section 18 finds application in the 
South African mining industry are distinguishable. This part is confined to the 
examples discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Anglo Platinum Mines Rustenburg Base Metal Refineries 
 
During 2008 and early 2009, Solidarity was organised in Anglo’s Rustenburg Base 
Metal Refineries ("RBMR"), which at that stage had two categories of bargaining 
units, namely the junior unit, which ranged from levels A1-B6, and the senior unit, 
which ranged from levels B7-C5. Solidarity had an approximate 2% membership 
within the junior unit, but enjoyed recognition in the senior unit with a percentage of 
28, 5%.  
 
In terms of the recognition agreement which lapsed on 31 January 2009, the 
requisite level for recognition was 30% representation in the operators and/or 
supervisory units.  By virtue of Solidarity having reached the 30% representation 
threshold, it has enjoyed organisational rights as contained in the LRA as well as 
recognition to be party to certain participative forums. Towards the end of January 
2009, after the recognition agreement setting the recognition threshold at 30% had 
lapsed, a new agreement was entered into between the majority unions NUMSA, 
NUM and Anglo Platinum, which aimed at increasing the threshold for recognition to 
40%.  
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Solidarity launched a major recruitment drive which was aimed at recruiting at least 
30 new members in the senior bargaining unit, which would have ensured that it 
reached the required 40% representation threshold as set out in the agreement.  
Solidarity failed to recruit these members and as a result could not reach the 40% 
representation within the senior bargaining unit. It was given 90 days’ notice of the 
withdrawal of its recognition status and was thereafter not able to meet the required 
threshold after three verification exercises. The recognition agreement between 
Anglo and Solidarity was terminated at the end of the third month of the notice 
period. The effect of this was that Solidarity lost all its members in RBMR. 
 
3.3.2 Kumba Resources: Sishen Iron Ore (SIO) 
 
During the course of 2003, Solidarity and SIO entered into a recognition agreement. 
Solidarity has consistently reached the threshold for "significant representativeness," 
as contemplated in the recognition agreement. The said agreement is currently still 
in operation and Solidarity enjoys the organisational rights contemplated in clause 5 
of the agreement. 
 
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) is the majority trade union in SIO. NUM 
has consistently been placing pressure on SIO management to conclude a threshold 
agreement (in terms of section 18 of the LRA) that would effectively render the 
existence of other trade unions in SIO impossible. 
 
During the course of November 2010, NUM sent a letter to SIO formally requesting 
the conclusion of a threshold agreement in terms of section 18(1) and (2) of the 
LRA. The said letter states NUM’s intention to have the threshold set at 50% + 1 
membership of the total workforce within the bargaining unit within a workplace for 
any union seeking organisational rights. 
 
NUM’s pressure on SIO management is steadily mounting. To date Solidarity has 
continued to indicate that it has a separate recognition agreement with SIO which 
remains in full force. To date SIO has not indicated that it intends to terminate the 
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recognition agreement with Solidarity. NUM has indicated that it will seriously 
consider strike action in order to place pressure on SIO to conclude a collective 
agreement in terms of section 18. 
 
3.3.3 Lonmin Plc 
 
Solidarity has approximately 1000 members in Lonmin Plc. The current bargaining 
unit structure provides for 3 bargaining categories, namely Category 3 to 8 workers, 
Miners and Artisans and Officials. NUM organises mainly in the Category 3 to 8 
workers barganing unit, Solidarity organises mainly in the Miners and Artisans 
bargaining unit, while Solidarity and the United Association of South Africa (UASA) 
mainly organise in the officials bargaining unit. Solidarity has 46% representation in 
the Miners and Artisans bargaining unit, which is where their main strength lies. 
 
NUM has begun pushing for a new collective agreement in terms of section 18, 
which provides for only two bargaining units. NUM proposes that category 3 to 9 
workers should become the one bargaining unit, while Miners and Arisans and 
Officials become the second bargaining unit. NUM furthermore demands that 
recognition should no longer be measured at the 30% threshold inside workplaces 
within mines in the Lonmin Plc Group, but rather should be measured at 20% in the 
two proposed bargaining units groupwide. 
 
The inclusion of category 9 (C lower band) workers in the proposed bargaining unit 
to encompass category 3 to 9 workers, results in a significant number of the workers 
currently in the Miners and Artisans bargaining unit where Solidarity is the strongest 
union falling inside a bargaining unit where Solidarity has virtually no members. 
Even if the groupwide 20% threshold is not agreed upon, the new bargaining unit 
structure will result in Solidarity’s level of 46% representation in the Miners and 
Artisans bargaining unit significantly diminishing. 
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The new bargaining unit structure, when implemented, will result in Solidarity and 
UASA being unable to reach the 20% groupwide representation threshold. This will 
inevitably result in the loss of recognition for these trade unions. 
 
4 The impact of the LRA on minority unions and their members 
 
The examples set out in the preceding paragraphs, indicate that minority unions are 
often faced with a situation where majority trade unions and employers agree to 
establish a threshold for representativeness in terms of section 18(1) of the LRA that 
is unreachable for minority unions.32 Quite clearly this creates a situation where a 
minority union cannot obtain organisational rights in terms of sections 12 and 13 of 
the LRA.33 
 
This results in a minority union not being able to recruit members in the workplace 
and not being able tohave their subscriptions deducted from their members’ salaries 
on a monthly basis, despite the support that a minority union may enjoy in a certain 
bargaining unit of the employer. It is extremely difficult for a union in this position to 
increase its membership, which again ensures that it will never reach the set 
threshold. 
 
The implications of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Bader Bop 
(Pty) Ltd & another judgment,34 namely that a trade union is entitled to embark on 
strike action in order to obtain organisational rights in circumstances where it is not 
regarded as sufficiently representative, provides some form of relief for minority 
unions. Even in circumstances where wages are concerned, it is often difficult to 
muster enough support for a strike. This is even more so when it comes to 
convincing members to embark on a strike in order to assist their trade union to 
obtain organisational rights. 
 
                                                 
32  South African Post Office Ltd v Commissioner Nowosenetz 2013 2 BLLR 216 (LC). 
33  Access to the workplace and deduction of trade union subscriptions or levies. 
34  National Union of Metalworkers v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ (CC). 
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There also seems to be a high prevalence of cases where the threshold is raised in a 
new collective agreement after the previous collective agreement (with a lower 
threshold) expires, in order to strenghten the position of the majority union and 
diminish the impact that a minority union had while it enjoyed recognition.35 The loss 
of recognition as a result of the raising of the threshold impacts heavily on minority 
unions. This has the effect that a trade union, which in certain circumstances has 
enjoyed certain organisational rights for a period of time, loses recognition (and as a 
result lose the organisational rights) that it had enjoyed up to that point. In these 
circumstances minority unions as a rule almost certainly loses their members in that 
specific workplace, because these members fail to see the advantages of belonging 
to a trade union when it has no organisational or bargaining rights. 
 
A further situation which quite often occurs is that an agency shop or a closed shop 
agreement in terms of sections 25(1) of the LRA exists in the workplace. 36 Members 
of a minority union might be moved to be a member of a majority trade union and 
pay the required monthly subscription and the compulsory agency fee, if the 
majority union can benefit them in the workplace. However, remaining a member of 
a minority union, and paying the monthly dues in terms of the agency shop 
agreement, in circumstances where a minority union has lost recognition as a result 
of a section 18 collective agreement, is in practice not often seen. 
 
The ultimate result is that quite often the position of minority unions worsens as a 
result of agreements in terms of section 18 and the consequent loss of recognition, 
as this as a rule translates into the loss of members. Members of minority unions are 
thisleft without a union of choice to bargain on their behalf 
 
  
                                                 
35  South African Post Office Ltd v Commissioner Nowosenetz 2013 2 BLLR 216 (LC). 
36  In terms of s 25(1) of the LRA a representative trade union and an employer or employers’ 
organisation may conclude a collective agreement, to be known as an agency shop agreement, 
requiring the employer to deduct an agreed agency fee from the wages of employees identified 
in the agreement who are not members of the trade union but are eligible for membership 
thereof. 
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5 Bargaining units and the term "workplace" 
 
One of the major functions of trade unions is that of procuring better working 
conditions and wages for its members.37 Vettori38 asserts that the most important 
instrument of serving the interest of the members of trade union is collective 
bargaining. She argues that the primary role played by collective bargaining in South 
African labour law in terms of the LRA is extended to non-distributive or non-
production-related issues. This is apparent in the provisions regarding workplace 
forums and bargaining units. Therefore it is important to define the concept 
bargaining units and workplace for the purposes of the discussion to follow. 
 
The term "workplace" is defined by the LRA as:39 
 
The place or places where the employees of an employer work. If an employer 
carries on two or more operations that are independent of one another by reason 
of their size, function or organisation, the place or places where employees work in 
connection with each independent operation, constitutes a workplace. 
 
In addition, section 213 of the LRA defines "workplace" in relation to the public 
service as follows: 
 
for the purposes of collective bargaining and dispute resolution, the registered 
scope of the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council or a Bargaining Council 
in a sector in the public service, as the case may be; or for any other purpose, a 
national department, provincial administration, provincial department or 
organisational component contemplated in section 7(2) of the Public Service Act, 
1994 (promulgated by Proclamation 103 of 1994), or any other part of the public 
service that the Minister for Public Service and Administration, after consultation 
with the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council, demarcates as a 
workplace; In all other instances means the place or places where the employees of 
an employer work. If an employer carries on or conducts two or more operations 
that are independent of one another by reason of their size, function or 
organisation, the place where employees work in connection with each independent 
operation constitutes the workplace for that operation. 
 
                                                 
37  ILO 2005 www.ilo.org 17-21; Muhammad 2010 Far East Journal of Psychology and Business 79-
82. 
38  Vettori Alternative Means 88-105. 
39  Section 213 of the LRA. 
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This definition, specifically subsection (c) thereof, envisages the existence of more 
than one workplace where employees work in connection with each independent 
operation, and is applicable in this case. This definition has been criticised as being 
too wide and vague with Cheadle stating that it is evident from this definition that a 
workplace can be made up of one or more places of work and that each case will 
depend on its own facts.40 
 
In dealing with this issue, Grogan41 refers to the matter of OCGAWU v Volkswagen 
of South Africa (Pty) Ltd.42 Grogan asserts that the commissioner in this case noted 
that the legislature recognised that the term workplace could have a different 
meaning than that of the statutory definition as quoted above, where the context 
indicated to the contrary. The commissioner further held that if the term, when used 
in chapter III of the LRA, is to be given the statutory meaning, this would lead to 
absurdities. 
 
The commissioner held that for at least the implementation of section 18 of the LRA, 
the measure should be the level of representivity of a trade union within a 
bargaining unit. The commissioner further held that the legislature's intention could 
not have been to promote majoritarianism so far as to diminish the rights of unions 
which have established majority status in a particular bargaining unit. He further 
contends that a threshold of a majority in the workplace as a whole would constitute 
a radical departure from the rights won by unions in their historical bargaining 
constituencies.  It is plausible that the bargaining units formed along the defined 
categories of officials, union men, and category 2 to 8 employees each satisfy the 
requirements of a "workplace" in terms of the interpretation accorded thereto in 
terms of the OCGAWU case. If this line of argumentation is applied, it would negate 
the cynical workings of section 18. 
 
  
                                                 
40  Cheadle 1994 Current Labour Law. 
41  Grogan Collective Labour Law 333. 
42  OCGAWU v Volkswagen of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2002 23 ILJ 220 (CCMA). 
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6 Analysis of section 18 of the LRA in view of the provisions of section 
21(8)(b) of the LRA 
 
Section 21 sets out how organisational and collective bargaining rights in the LRA 
may be exercised. When a registered trade union wishes to exercise its collective 
bargaining rights, section 21(1) provides that such a trade union may notify its 
employer of its intention to do so in a workplace. Disputes arising from the exercise 
of section 21 rights must be referred to arbitration before the CCMA. 
 
Subsection (8)(b) sets out criteria for consideration by the Commissioner in the 
event that such a referral is made, which the Commissioner is obliged to consider if 
the employer seeks to withdraw any of the organisational rights conferred on trade 
unions in terms of the LRA. This provision reads: 
 
If the unresolved dispute is about whether or not the registered trade union is a 
representative trade union, the commissioner must seek to minimise the 
proliferation of trade union representation in a single workplace and, where 
possible, to encourage a system of a representative trade union in a workplace; and 
to minimise the financial and administrative burden of requiring an employer to 
grant organisational rights to more than one registered trade union, the 
commissioner must consider; the nature of the workplace; the nature of the one or 
more organisational rights that the registered trade union seeks to exercise; the 
nature of the sector in which the workplace is situated; and the organisational 
history at the workplace or any other workplace of the employer; and may 
withdraw any of the organisational rights conferred by this Part and which are 
exercised by any other registered trade union in respect of that workplace, if that 
other trade union has ceased to be a representative trade union. 
 
It is clear from this section that mere numbers are not the only consideration and 
that the history of the workplace and the membership therein are, amongst others, 
significant factors to be considered before a trade union’s representative status is 
revoked. 
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7 International labour standards, constitutional principles and 
recommendations by the Committee for Freedom of Association 
(CFA) 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
At this stage it becomes important to assess the tenability of section 18 of the LRA. 
As a point of departure for this assessment, this part aims to assess international 
labour standards, recommendations by the CFA43 and relevant international case 
law. Due to the importance of international and foreign law in the South African 
context, this may provide important principles when conducting this assessment. 
 
In terms of section 39(1) of the Constitution the courts are required when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights to promote values that underline an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Similarly, the 
courts are also required to  consider international law, and may consider foreign law. 
 
Furthermore, section 232 of the Constitution states: "Customary international law is 
law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or the parliament, " 
while section 233 states: "When interpreting any legislation, every court must refer 
any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international 
law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law. " 
 
According to Van Niekerk et al, section 39(1) creates the expectation that public 
international law, both that which is binding due to ratification as well as that which 
is not binding due to South Africa not being a party thereto, should be used for 
                                                 
43  The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) is a Governing Body Committee of the ILO. It 
was established by the ILO in 1951 for the purpose of examining complaints against member 
states for violations of freedom of association, whether or not the member state concerned had 
ratified the relevant Conventions. If the CFA finds that there has been a violation of freedom of 
association standards, it issues a report and makes recommendations on how the situation could 
be remedied. Governments are requested to report on the implementation of its 
recommendations. 
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interpreting legislation. In the case of S v Makwanyane the Court remarked as 
follows:44 
 
International agreements and customary international law provide a framework 
within which…(the Bill of Rights) can be evaluated and understood and for that 
purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the 
United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Interim American Commission on 
Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, had inappropriate cases, 
report of specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation may 
provide guidance as to the correct interpretation of particular provisions.45 
 
Dugard notes that international law is not foreign law and as such South African 
courts may take judicial notice thereof as if it forms part of the common law.46 In 
practice, he contends, the courts may turn to findings of international tribunals as 
well as international treaties in dealing with certain questions.47 In the matter of 
Avril Elizabeth Home,48 Van Niekerk AJ adopted the following line of reasoning in 
order to legitimately draw upon the contents of an unratified convention of the ILO 
in dealing with the matter before him:49 
 
Although South Africa has not ratified Convention 158, and is therefore not obliged 
to implement its terms in domestic legislation, the Convention is an important and 
influential point of reference in the interpretation and application of the LRA. 
 
The observations and surveys by the ILO's Committee of Experts on Convention 158 
are equally important as a point of reference in the interpretation of Chapter VIII of 
the LRA and the Code since they give content to the standards that the Convention 
establishes. This is particularly so in the present instance because both Chapter VIII 
and the Code draw heavily on the wording of Convention 158. 
 
                                                 
44  1995 3 SA 391 (CC), 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC). 
45  See also South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 20 ILJ 2265 (CC). In 
this case the CC relied amongst others on international instruments for determining the meaning 
of “worker”. 
46  Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
47  Dugard Essays 119. 
48  Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and 
Arbitration 2006 ZALC 122. 
49  National Union of Metalworkers v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ (CC). 
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The approach adopted by van Niekerk AJ in the above matter was that it was 
manifest that the legislature had drawn on Convention 158 in Chapter VIII and the 
Code and therefore it was appropriate to use the the contents thereof in 
adjudicating the matter. When one proceeds to the interpretation of the LRA, section 
3 thereof states the following: 
 
Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions - to give effect to its 
primary objects; in compliance with the constitution; in compliance with the public 
international law obligations of the Republic. 
 
It is therefore clear that when one interprets the provisions of the LRA, these 
provisions are subject to the fundamental principles contained in the Constitution. In 
interpreting these provisions there must be compliance with the standards contained 
in international law, due to South Africa's membership of the ILO. 
 
7.2 International standards on majoritarianism and pluralism 
 
The Digest of Decisions of the CFA contains its recommendations on majoritarianism 
and pluralism. Its recommendations clearly states that, while it may be to the 
advantage of workers to avoid a multiplicity of trade union movements, unification 
through state intervention, be it a direct or indirect result of legislative provisions 
applicable to trade unions, is contrary to the principle embodied in articles 2 and 11 
of the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise.50 It clearly states that it is preferable for governments to seek to 
encourage trade unions to join together voluntarily to form strong and united 
organisations than to legislate compulsory unification upon trade unions, a course of 
action which runs contrary to the principles of freedom of association embodied in 
the International Labour Conventions. 
 
  
                                                 
50  Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948) (Convention 
No. 87). In terms of this Convention each member of the International Labour Organisation for 
which this is in force undertakes to undertake all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure 
that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise. 
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7.3 International standards on the right to freedom of association 
 
The right to freedom of association is described by Emerson as the judicial and 
moral entitlement of workers to form trade unions,  to join a trade union of their 
own choosing, and to see that such a trade union functions independently.51 The 
right to freedom of assosciation is a fundamental right which is protected in a 
number of international instruments.52 The ILO’s Declaration of Philadelphia 
(adopted on 10 May 1944) holds that freedom of expression and association are 
essential to sustained progress.53 Article 1 of Convetion 87 states as follows:54 
 
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to 
establish and, subject to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join 
organisations of their own choosing without previous authorization. 
 
This right is similarly protected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political  
Rights.55 Article 22 thereof states: 
 
Everyone has a right to freedom of association with others, including the right to 
form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests. 
 
The ILO requires respect for and adherence to the principle of freedom of  
association, as is clear from the following quotation: 56 
 
Respect for freedom of association around the world is a fundamental and 
unavoidable requirement for the International Labour Organisation, because of its 
most essential structural characteristic, namely tripartism. Without freedom of 
association or, in other words, without employers’ and workers’ organisations that 
are autonomous, independent, representative and endowed with the necessary 
rights and guarantees for the furtherance and defence of the rights of their 
members and the advancement of the common welfare, the principle of tripartism 
would be impaired, if not ignored, and chances for greater social justice would be 
seriously prejudiced. 
                                                 
51  Emerson 1964 Yale L Rev 1-35; Budeli 2009 Fundamina 57-74. 
52  See, for example, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) (Banjul Charter); the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
53  ILO Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) Chapter I(b). 
54  Convention No. 87 (ratified by South Africa). 
55  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
56  ILO Law on Freedom of Association. 
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7.4 International precedents/comparative law 
 
Olivier57 refers to a case which is important forthe  purpose of evaluating the 
tenability of section 18 of the LRA. In the matter of Wilson v UK,58 the members of a 
trade union stated that the employer's retraction of the recognition of their trade 
union violated their right of expression (section 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 1953, hereafter ECHR) as well as their right to association (article 11 
of the ECHR). The applicants' case was that the allowance of discrimination towards 
members of the trade union in terms of English law was contrary to the prohibition 
of discrimination as contained in article 14 of the ECHR. The European Commission 
of Human Rights unanimously found that the right of freedom of association, as 
entrenched in article 11 of the ECHR, was violated by this conduct. Olivier noted that 
the European Commission of Human Rights found that the article 11 right allowed 
for trade union freedom as a special form of the principle of freedom of association. 
 
In the matter of Demir and Baykara v Turkey59 the European Commission of Human 
Rights found that collective bargaining has in principle become an essential element 
of  article 11( the right to associate). The court stated that only interference which is 
strictly necessary in a democratic society can be justified, but also stated that it is 
still allowed to grant special status to representative trade unions. 
 
7.5 International standards on the right to collective bargaining 
 
The right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right that is confirmed by member 
states of the ILO by virtue of their membership. This right is protected in a number 
of international instruments. Part of the 10-point plan adopted by the ILO in the 
Declaration of Philadelphia is the effective recognition of the right of collective 
bargaining, and the co-operation of management and labour in the continued 
improvement of productive efficiency and the collaboration of workers and 
                                                 
57  Olivier Dissipline, Ontslag en Menseregte Handleiding 91. 
58  Wilson v UK 2002 35 EHRR 523. 
59  Demir and Baykara v Turkey 2008 ECHR 1345. 
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employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures..60 
Some of the other instruments which protect and regulate this right are, the Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949, (ratified by South Africa), 
the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998, the Collective 
Bargaining Convention of 1981, and the Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 
1981. 
 
The standards and principles emerging from the ILO's Conventions, 
Recommendations and other instruments set forth by the committee of experts and 
the CFA include a trade union which represents the majority or a high percentage of 
the workers in a bargaining unit, enjoying preferential or exclusive bargaining rights. 
However, in cases where no trade union fulfils these conditions or such exclusive 
rights are not recognised, workers' organisations should nevertheless be able to 
conclude a collective agreement on behalf of their own members.  
 
Where under a system of nominating an exclusive bargaining agent there is no union 
representing the required percentage to be so designated, collective bargaining 
rights should be granted to all unions in this unit, at least on behalf of their own 
members. According to Adams et al this means that employees who want to be 
represented by minority unions have an international human right to bargain 
collectively. 61 If there is no union covering more than 50% of the workers in a unit, 
collective bargaining rights should nevertheless be granted to unions in the unit at 
least on behalf of their members.62 
 
The right to bargain freely with employers with respect to conditions of work 
constitutes an essential element in freedom of association, and trade unions should 
have the right, through collective bargaining or other lawful means, to seek to 
improve the living and working conditions of those whom the trade unions 
represent. The public authorities should refrain from any interference which would 
                                                 
60  ILO Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) Chapter III(e). 
61  Adams 2009 CLELJ 382. 
62  This principle was also approvingly referred to by the CFA in The Glass, Cement and Soil 
Industries Workers' Union Case No 2303 (Turkey) (2003) para 1373. 
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restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof. Any such interference would 
appear to infringe the principle that workers' and employers' organisations should 
have the right to organise their activities and to formulate their programmes.63 
 
7.6 International standards on the right to organise 
 
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention has 
been ratified by South Africa. In terms of article 11 of this Convention each member 
of the ILO for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and 
appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the 
right to organise. 
 
The Digest of Decisions of the CFA64 (the CFA had by 1997 adjudicated upon at least 
1800 cases which are mostly found in the Digest65) sets out the general principles 
relating to the right of organisations to freely organise their activities and to 
formulate their programmes. These include the preclusion of any provision which 
gives the authorities the right to restrict trade union activities in relation to the 
activities and objects conventionally pursued by trade unions, for example.66  
 
The necessary measures should be taken to ensure that access is granted freely to 
farmworkers, domestic workers and workers in the mining industry by trade unions 
and their officials for the purpose of carrying out normal union activities on the 
premises of employers. 
 
7.7 Recommendations on the recognition of most representative trade 
unions 
 
The CFA has stated that the mere fact that the law of a country distinguishes 
between the most representative trade unions and other trade unions is not in itself 
                                                 
63  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 515. 
64  ILO Law on Freedom of Association 2. 
65  Olivier Dissipline, Ontslag en Menseregte Handleiding 90. 
66  ILO Law on Freedom of Association 95. 
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a matter for criticism. Such a distinction should not result in the most representative 
organisations being granted privileges extending beyond that of priority in 
representation, on the ground of their having the largest membership, for such 
purposes as collective bargaining or consultation by governments, or for the purpose 
of nominating delegates to international bodies. In other words, this distinction 
should not have the effect of depriving trade union organisations that are not 
recognized as being among the most representative of the essential means for 
defending the occupational interests of their members, for organising their 
administration and activities and formulating their programmes, as provided for in 
Convention 87.67 It further provides that workers' freedom of choice would be 
jeopardised if the distinction between most representative and minority unions 
results, in law or in practice, in the prohibition of other trade unions which workers 
would like to join, or in the granting of privileges such as to influence unduly the 
choice of organisation of workers.  
 
In addition, the CFA has stated that the granting of exclusive rights to the most 
representative organisation should not mean that the existence of other unions to 
which certain workers might wish to belong is prohibited. Minority organisations 
should be permitted to carry out their activities and at least to have the right to 
speak on behalf of their members and to represent them.68 
 
According to Adams, majoritarian exclusivity is consistent with the principles of 
international human rights,69 but exclusive majoritarian exclusivity is not. Adams 
further notes that any legislative regime designed to eradicate the possibility of 
minority unionism offends workers' rights. 
 
  
                                                 
67  ILO Freedom of Association Digest para 143. 
68  Ibid para 974. 
69  Van der Walt Democratisation of the Workplace 391. 
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8 Democracy, constitutionally entrenched labour rights and workplace 
democracy 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This part deals with the constitutionally entrenched rights to engage in collective 
bargaining, to organise, and the right to freedom of association. It dwells on the 
relation between the right to freedom of association and other fundamental rights.  
The core meaning of democracy and the term industrial democracy are also 
assessed. The purpose here is to evaluate what the aforementioned rights entail and 
the constitutionality of section 18. 
 
8.2 Relevant provisions of the Constitution 
 
The founding principles of the Constitution set positive standards with which all law 
in South Africa must comply in order to be valid. These founding principles are the 
prism through which the Constitution should be viewed. 
 
Such provisions include the founding principles of human dignity, the achievement of 
equality70 and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.71 The supremacy of 
the Constitution and the rule of law72 are further important provisions for the 
purposes of this assessment. These provisions provide the key to the understanding 
of the core meaning of democracy. Section 7(1) of the Constitution further affirms 
the democratic principles and lays the foundation for the interpretation of the 
fundamental rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution by stating: "The Bill of Rights is a 
cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom." 
 
The right to fair labour practice is protected by section 23 of the Constitution. The 
LRA was enacted to give effect to this right, and is the national legislation envisaged 
                                                 
70  Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that "Everyone is equal before the law and has the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law". 
71  Section 1(a) of the Constitution. 
72  Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 
J KRUGER AND CI TSHOOSE                                                PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
308 / 487 
by this section to regulate collective bargaining. If any labour practice infringes this 
right it is unlawful and unconstitutional, subject to the application of section 36(1). 
Section 36 of the Constitution, read in conjunction with sections 7(3), 37 and 39 
thereof, is the main provision that determines the degree to which a right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights can be limited. In terms of section 36(2) of the 
Constitution any limitation of an entrenched right in the Bill of Rights should occur in 
terms of section 36(1).73The provisions of section 39(2) of the Constitution are 
important when it comes to the assessment of the tenability of section 18 of the 
LRA. This section states: "When interpreting any legislation and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
 
8.3 The right to engage in collective bargaining 
 
The right to collective bargaining is a human right that enjoyed protection under the 
interim Constitution and which enjoys protection under the final Constitution. 
Notably the interim Constitution's wording in this regard  was "workers and 
employers shall have the right to organise and to bargain collectively."74 The 
wording of the final Constitution has been changed, however, by the introduction of 
the word "engage." Section 23(5) states: 
 
Every trade union, employers' organisation and employer has the right to engage in 
collective bargaining. National legislation may be enacted to regulate collective 
bargaining. To the extent that legislation may limit a right in this Chapter, the 
limitation must comply with section 36(1). 
 
The LRA has removed the duty to bargain, which was previously imposed by the 
Industrial Court. Because collective bargaining is no longer compelled by law, it has 
adopted a set of organisational rights for trade unions. 
 
  
                                                 
73  Olivier Managing Employment Relations. 
74  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 515. 
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8.4 The constitutional right to organise 
 
Section 23(4)(b) of the Constitution states that "Every trade union and every 
employers' organisation has the right to organise." According to Currie and De Waal 
the rights conferred in section 23(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution go beyond the 
"limited" right to freedom of association and are more fundamental in nature. Currie 
further asserts that the LRA gives effect to these rights by granting a number of 
organisational rights including the right of access to the employer's premises for 
union-related purposes; the right to hold meetings; the right to conduct ballots; the 
right to stop-order facilities; the right of union office bearers to be given time off for 
union activities; the right to elect trade union representatives; and the right to 
disclosure of information for the purposes of collective bargaining.75 
 
8.5 The relation between the right to freedom of association and other 
fundamental rights 
 
Olivier notes that the right to freedom of association encompasses the right to 
organise and the right to further the interests of members of a trade union.76 He 
further asserts that freedom of association is related to the right to organise,  the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. 77 According to Olivier the effect 
of the denial of freedom of association is that the right to collective bargaining is 
undermined. He states that a legal scheme aimed at protecting the right of workers 
and trade unions to collective bargaining and to strike will be meaningless if the 
underlying right to join and belong to a trade union is not protected. Conversely, he 
argues, the right to freedom of association will remain an ineffective right if the right 
to collective bargaining and the right to strike are not recognised as well. The right 
to freedom of association is therefore referred to as a "shorthand expression for a 
bundle of rights and freedoms relating to membership of associations of workers and 
employers."78 
                                                 
75  Section 12 of the LRA. 
76  Olivier Dissipline, Ontslag en Menseregte Handleiding 89. 
77  Olivier Dissipline, Ontslag en Menseregte Handleiding 4. 
78  Budeli 2009 Fundamina 57-74. 
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9 The core meaning of democracy 
 
Political equality manifesting in the equal franchise for all adult citizens is central to 
democracy.79 The right to vote is a basic criterion with which to measure the 
authenticity of a system claiming to be democratic. The more democratic a system 
claims to be, the closer it should come to universal franchise. This principle is 
implemented through a system of representation of voters, in the case of South 
Africa specifically by proportional representation.80 
 
Malan81 asserts that a multi-communal society needs a specific form of democracy, 
namely a pluralist instead of a utalitarian or majoritarian democracy. He states that 
majoritarian democracy gives full effect to the will of the majority regardless of the 
effect on minorities. The will of the strongest prevails, while minorities are left 
powerless to deal with core questions that may be paramount to their wellbeing. 
 
Malan further notes that majoritarian democracy based on utilitarian principlse is 
democratic only in part, namely to the extent that the majority is the only part of the 
demos that can govern in its own interest, but that such a system is undemocratic in 
that it leaves the minorities devoid of any kratos, and thus vulnerable to domination 
by the majority. Malan states that those belonging to a minority are treated on the 
same footing as minors who are subject to the authority of adults. He notes that 
their right to be treated as equals is in this way blatantly violated.82 
 
Malan notes that the Constitutional Court has on various occasions strongly 
endorsed the notion of pluralism, of a pluralist democracy, of tolerance for diversity 
and difference, and expressed itself strongly against homogenisation and 
assimilation.83 In the matter of Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie84 the court held 
that there are a number of constitutional provisions that underlie the constitutional 
                                                 
79  Dworkin 1987 USFL Rev 1-30; Wall 2006 Journal of Political Philosophy 85-100. 
80  Lister 2012 Stan J Int’l L 257-276; Bellamy 2012 CRISPP 1-23. 
81  Malan 2010 TSAR 427-440. 
82  Malan 2010 TSAR 427-440. 
83  Malan 2010 TSAR 427-440. 
84  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para 61 380C-E. 
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value of acknowledging the value of diversity and pluralism in our society, and that 
give a particular texture to the broadly phrased right to freedom of association.85 
 
Malan contends that citizens in a pluralist democracy affirm the right to self-
expression without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and 
religious norms of others. A pluralist democracy strikes a balance between majority 
rule and minority protection. Malan states that this is balance is achieved by 
acknowledging the general right of the majority to govern on account of the majority 
obtained at the ballot box, but at the same time by recognising the right of cultural 
and other minorities to survive and to flourish as communities. According to Malan, a 
constitutional democracy has a constitution that protects certain basic rights which 
act as a counter to unbridled majoritarianism, as the constitution places these rights 
outside the reach of the political power of the majority.86 
 
10 Industrial democracy 
 
According to Van der Walt87 the notion of an industrial democracy has been 
translated into legislation through the LRA, which states in section 1: "The purpose 
of the Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the 
democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objectives of this Act... "88 
He further notes that the drafters of the Act wished to extend the government's 
intention of democratising the country to the workplace in a similar way as found in 
a number of countries, most notably Germany and the Netherlands whose systems 
were used as models for the LRA. Importantly, section 1 of the LRA refers to one of 
the primary objects that it aims to fulfill as the aim to give effect to the rights 
conferred by section 27 of the Constitution.89 
 
                                                 
85  Section 18 of the Constitution. 
86  Malan 2010 TSAR 427-440. 
87  Van der Walt Democratisation of the Workplace. 
88  Section 1 of the LRA. 
89  Section 27 refers to the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, 
which was replaced by s 23 of the present Constitution. 
J KRUGER AND CI TSHOOSE                                                PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
312 / 487 
Van der Walt continues by stating that industrial democracy is the application of 
democratic principles in the workplace and entails that workers as members of a 
particular unit participate in decision making. The desire for democracy in the 
workplace continues to increase, and it seems natural that the same principles found 
in the larger society should also apply to the workplace. Brassey90 asserts: 
 
Democratisation is the process by which those to whom decisions relate are given a 
greater say in the process of decision making; the right to vote, which (for 
example) enjoys protection under section 19(3)a of the Constitution, is but one 
manifestation of the democratic process; others include the right to be consulted or 
heard before a decision is taken. 
 
The principle of proportional representation also applies to collective bargaining in 
the workplace and is not only limited to parliamentary participation. Malan further 
notes that,91 insofar as any of the entrenched rights in section 23 of the Constitution 
are not given effect to, the democratic integrity of the Constitution, as entrenched in 
section 1 thereof, is compromised. 
 
The rights in section 23 cannot but be interpreted in the light of the provisions of 
section 1 of the Constitution. The founding principle of equality, as mentioned 
above, therefore entails that the right of a trade union to engage in collective 
bargaining should be regarded as an equal right. The correct view of the entrenched 
rights of section 23 would be to say that these rights are entrenched with the 
purpose of ensuring that the democratic principle prevails in the labour context. 
 
Therefore, any measures taken by the LRA to limit access to organisational rights 
(being a core ingredient of collective bargaining) would fall foul of the provisions of 
equality and the core meaning of democracy. As such, this would constitute an 
unfair limitation of the rights entrenched in section 23 of the Constitution. The 
impact of the sections of the LRA under discussion on minority unions and their 
members is in effect tantamount to disenfranchising workers from democracy in the 
                                                 
90  Brassey Employment and Labour Law 1-5. 
91  Malan 2010 TSAR 427-440. 
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labour context.  Only workers belonging to trade unions who have organisational 
rights are given the opportunity to engage in collective bargaining. 
 
11 Workplace forums: The democratisation of work or an exercise in 
futility? 
 
It is important to view the effects of section 18 against the background of section 80 
of the LRA. This section contains, amongst others, the following provisions:92 
 
A workplace forum may be established in any workplace in which an employer 
employs more than 100 employees. Any representative trade union may apply to 
the Commission in the prescribed form for the establishment of a workplace forum. 
 
The aim of the legislature with the inclusion of workplace forums in the LRA, namely 
to address the need of employees and employers to have more interaction that is 
aimed at working together in a positive fashion in ways other than formal collective 
bargaining structures and processes,93 is one that is worthy of applause. However 
the notion of workplace forums has failed dismally in the South African context.94 In 
practice very few workplace forums were established.95 Olivier not only criticises the 
legislature for crafting the provisions of the LRA in such a manner that it openly 
protects the monopoly of majority trade unions, but also suggests that the fact that 
a workplace forum and trade union-based forum can be established only through an 
application for the establishment thereof by a majority union96 is one of the major 
reasons for the failure of workplace and trade union-based forums in South Africa.97 
 
                                                 
92  In this section a representative trade union means a registered union, or two registered unions 
acting jointly, that have as members the majority of the employees employed by an employer in 
a workplace (s 78(b) of the LRA). 
93  Satgar 1998 LDD 48-55. 
94  Wood and Mahabir 2001 Industrial Relations Journal 230-241. 
95  Satgar 1998 LDD 43-60; DPRU 2008 blogs.uct.ac.za 10. 
96  Olivier 1996 ILJ 810-812. 
97  Steadman 2004 ILJ 1190. Steadman notes that majority trade unions are loathe to apply for the 
establishment of workplace forums because of their fear of the erosion of their power, their fear 
of the erosion of collective bargaining structures, and their fear of the strengthening of the 
position of non-trade union and minority trade union interests. 
J KRUGER AND CI TSHOOSE                                                PER / PELJ 2013(16)4 
 
 
314 / 487 
The concept of the workplace forum is one that holds great potential to ensure that 
the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining is effectively recognised. 
For minority trade unions and their members this would have been a welcome and 
excellent instrument to ensure that their voice is heard in the workplaces where 
majority trade unions for all practical purposes are calling the shots.98 The fact that 
the legislature saw fit to leave the key for the establishment of a workplace forum in 
the hands of majority unions has undone the potential that this concept has in our 
labour dispensation. For minority trade unions this means that their voice (and that 
of their members) is again stifled by legislation that on the face of it seems neutral 
and aimed at promoting collective bargaining, but in practice ensures that majority 
trade union monopoly is maintained. 
 
12 The effective recognition of the right to engage in collective 
bargaining as an equality challenge 
 
Blackett and Sheppard99 were commissioned by the ILO to write a Working Paper, as 
an input for preparing the ILO Director-General's Global Report to the 2003 session 
of the International Labour Conference. Their paper explores a complex and wide-
ranging subject, being the interface between collective bargaining and equality 
under current conditions of work. It argues that these two fundamental principles 
and rights are mutually reinforcing and can together promote workplace governance 
which reconciles economic with social goals.  
 
The authors conclude that the ILO's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work could hardly be clearer. Both the "effective recognition of collective 
bargaining" and the "elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation" are so central to the ILO's social justice mandate and decent work 
agenda that Members have a good faith obligation to respect, to promote and to 
realise them. Both "immutable" principles have their distinct, robust normative 
                                                 
98  Buhlungu 1999 African Sociology Review 111-129; See also Wood and Mahabir 2001 Industrial 
Relations Journal 230-241. 
99  Blackett and Sheppard 2002 www.ilo.org 1-52. 
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justification, with a deeply egalitarian and democratic thread underpinning them that 
stresses the centrality of enfranchisement within the world of work. 
They argue that unequal access to collective bargaining is an equality challenge. This 
decidedly broad approach to equality draws upon the deep egalitarianism that 
characterises the quest for social justice within the world of work. It also focuses on 
the purpose of protection against discrimination, to affirm the equal worth and 
dignity of all human beings and more specifically to ensure that the fundamental 
character of equality, recognised within the ILO's normative universe and beyond, is 
a reality in working peoples' lives. The approach is moreover compelled by the 
constitutional mandate of the ILO and its normative system to include “all workers.” 
There is a profound equality challenge surrounding access to collective bargaining, 
one that the Declaration calls on the ILO and its constituency to address. 
 
To affirm that collective bargaining mechanisms can both hamper and enhance 
equality is not necessarily to affirm that collective bargaining mechanisms are 
explicitly exclusionary. Although in some cases collective bargaining has been used 
as a majoritarian device to engage in direct discrimination against minority groups, 
the thrust of the unequal access claim is about systemic discrimination – that is, 
discrimination that is embedded in social and institutional practices, policies or rules. 
Simply put, in the design and application of machinery to give effect to the 
fundamental principle and right to collective bargaining, there were forgotten, 
overlooked or quite simply excluded categories rendered invisible to collective labour 
relations because they did not fall within the range of the dominant paradigm. As 
that dominant paradigm continued to shift, moreover, the asymmetries deepened as 
the vehicles to render collective bargaining effective failed even to capture the 
increasingly plural workplace realities. 
 
Accordingly there is also an element of pragmatism in the link between freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. In other words, for the freedom of association 
to be fully meaningful, its exercise must be enhanced to ensure real participation in 
matters that affect workers'’ lives. The participation entails ensuring that there are 
mechanisms for giving people a voice within the workplace and the broader world of 
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work. The effective recognition of the right to bargain collectively encompasses the 
recognition of a complex and varying combination of factors. State enabling action is 
needed to ensure that appropriate facilitative regulatory frameworks are in place, 
and, seemingly paradoxically, that there is also freedom from state intervention, to 
ensure that workers and employers can negotiate the conditions that govern them. 
 
The impact of section 18 on minority unions has been comprehensively discussed 
above, and the discussion brings the constitutionality of the legislation into question. 
Constitutional rights that come into play are the right to engage in collective 
bargaining, the right to freedom of association and the right to organise. All these 
rights are constitutionally entrenched and safeguarded. 
 
A strong argument can be made that if any of the entrenched rights in section 23 of 
the Constitution are not geffected the integrity of the Constitution is compromised. 
 
13 Options for minority unions 
 
A minority union, or an alliance of minority trade unions acting together, could lay a 
complaint with the ILO in terms of the Constitution of the ILO, raising the following 
issues: 
 
 The majority trade union monopoly instituted and maintained by the LRA 
through the provisions of sections 18 is contrary to the principles which are 
embodied in the international labour conventions relating to freedom of association. 
A minority union, or an alliance of minority trade unions acting together, can 
approach the Constitutional Court for a declaratory order seeking to have section 18 
declared unconstitutional.  
 
The basis for this application would be the following: 
 
 The limitation of the right to freedom of association, the right to organise and 
the right to engage in collective bargaining in the aforesaid sections of the LRA are 
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unjustifiable when the factors to be taken into account in terms of section 36(1) of 
the Constitution, are assessed. As a basis for interpreting the content of these rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights the content of international labour standards should be 
utilised. 
 
The effect of these sections is that employees associating with minority trade unions 
are treated in a different manner than persons associating with majority trade 
unions, with regard to access to their constitutional right to engage in collective 
bargaining and the right to organise. This differentiation is unjustifable in terms of 
section 9 of the Constitution when interpreted by means of international labour 
standards. 
 
When a minority union is faced with a situation where it loses recognition (in 
circumstances where it has constantly reached the threshold that existed in the 
previous collective agreement) due to the fact that the majority trade union and the 
employer raised the threshold for a trade union to be regarded as sufficiently 
representative in a new collective agreement, such a union could consider the option 
of approaching the Labour Court for a declaratory order to the effect that the 
constitutional right of freedom of association of its members has been infringed due 
to the loss of recognition brought about by the raising of the threshold in a manner 
that is contrary to international standards. If this application is refused the matter 
should be taken through the stages of appeal, through the Labour Appeal Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, and to the Constitutional Court, if necessary. 
 
When a minority union is faced with an award by a commissioner on the question as 
to whether such a union is sufficiently representative in a workplace or not, and  
where the Commissioner acts in accordance with the prescriptive provisions of 
section 21(8)(a)(i) of the LRA, this award should be taken on review to the Labour 
Court. When this application is refused the matter should be taken through the 
stages of appeal through the LAC and the SCA to the CC, if necessary. 
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It is furthermore recommended that government engages in dialogue with minority 
unions in order to come to a better understanding of the problem. Minority unions, 
which as a rule are not represented at the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC), find it difficult to attempt to change government's policy 
on majoritarianism. The matter should be placed before NEDLAC for discussion and 
the necessary action. It is furthermore recommended that government appoint a 
task team for making recommendations on the amendment of section 18 of the LRA 
and the writing of a code of good practice to minimise the negative effect of section 
18 on minority trade unions. This task team should in its investigation also assess 
the constitutionality of section 18 in the context of international labour standards. 
 
14 Conclusions 
 
This article has highlighted some of the intricate challenges associated with the 
interpretation and application of section 18 of the LRA on minority trade unions. It is 
argued that a number of sections in the LRA have the purpose of promoting 
majoritarianism, while at the same time placing almost insurmountable obstacles in 
the way of unions whose members are not in the majority in a workplace. The clear 
winners emerging from the collective bargaining framework of the LRA are majority 
trade unions. 
 
A particularly powerful provision included in the LRA is section 18, in terms of which 
a majority trade union and an employer have the right to conclude a collective 
agreement setting a threshold for representivity for other unions in a workplace to 
meet, failing which they will not be recognised as trade unions or have the 
accompanying organisational rights in terms of sections 12, 13 and 15 of the LRA. 
 
Furthermore, section 18 of the LRA permits workplace-specific bargaining by 
allowing a majority union in a workplace, as defined, to negotiate on behalf of all the 
employees in that workplace. What this section does not explicitly state is whether 
when such negotiation takes place the majority union and the employer may 
negotiate away the rights of currently recognised representative unions. Section 18 
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merely permits a majority union and an employer to enter into a collective 
bargaining agreement to regulate the organisational rights of workers within a 
bargaining unit. This section is accordingly permissive. 
 
The section itself contains no express internal limitations. In particular, it makes no 
reference to whether the negotiations permitted by the section may occur when 
other recognised unions are exercising organisational and bargaining rights or to the 
impact of such conduct on the rights of existing minority unions in the bargaining 
unit. Section 18 was not intended to promote collusion between employers and 
majority unions to deprive long-established unions and their members of their rights.  
 
On a proper interpretation, section 18 of the LRA cannot be read to condone the 
effective manipulation of the collective bargaining units so as to exclude minority 
trade unions from participating in collective bargaining on behalf of their members 
employed by a specific employer. Properly construed, section 18 should not be 
interpreted as a blanket licence for a "majority" union to eliminate the bargaining 
rights of unions which satisfy the criteria contemplated in section 21(b). It can 
therefore be concluded that when majority unions negotiate with employers 
regarding proposed thresholds of representativeness, recognised minority unions 
must be permitted to participate in the process, and that changes to existing 
bargaining units may not be unilaterally amended by agreements contemplated by 
section 18. 
 
In conclusion it can be argued that section 18(1) of the LRA does not support the 
interpretations of the ILO on Freedom of Association discussed above, that this 
provision is unconstitutional and in violation of international norms to the extent that 
it allows the effective exclusion of minority unions through manipulation by majority 
unions in collusion with the employer of recognised collective bargaining units and 
long-standing practice. 
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